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Abstract 
This paper will discuss security of medical images and review 
some work done regarding medical images. We will then 
propose a fragile watermarking scheme that can detect 
tamper and recover the image. Our method requires a secret 
key and a public chaotic mixing algorithm to embed and 
recover a tampered image. The scheme is also resilient to VQ 
attack. The purpose is to verify the integrity and authenticity 
of medical images. We used 800x600x8 bits ultrasound (US) 
greyscale images in our experiment. We test our algorithm 
for up to 50% tampered block. We obtained 100% recovery 
for spread-tampered block.  
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Introduction 
Security of medical images, derived from strict ethics and 
legislative rules, gives rights to the patient and duties to the 
health professionals. This imposes three mandatory 
characteristics: confidentiality, reliability and availability: 
• Confidentiality means that only the entitled persons 
have access to the images; 
• Reliability which has two aspects; Integrity: the image 
has not been modified by non-authorized person, and 
authentication: a proof that the image belongs indeed 
to the correct patient and is issued from the correct 
source; 
• Availability is the ability of an image to be used by the 
entitled persons in the normal conditions of access and 
exercise.  
Security risks of medical images can vary from random errors 
occurring during transmission to lost or overwritten segments 
in the network during exchanges in the intra- and inter-
hospital networks. One must also guarantee that the header of 
the image file always matches that of the image data. In 
addition to these unintentional modifications one can envision 
various malicious manipulations to replace or modify parts of 
the image, called tampering [1].  
The studies that are specifically directed to watermarking of 
medical images are few. Anand and Niranjan [2] propose to 
embed an encrypted version of the Electronic Patient Record 
(EPR) in the least significant bit (LSB) plane of the image. 
Miaou et al [3] similarly propose a LSB technique where the 
host image authenticates the transmission origin with an 
embedded message composed of various patient data (e.g 
ECG record), the diagnosis report and the doctor’s seal. [4], 
propose a trusted header scheme by embedding the hash of 
the file header of medical standard image in the image raw 
data. Coatrieux et al [5] propose Region of Interest (ROI) to 
preserve the diagnostic zone and Region of Non Interest 
(RONI) whose integrity needs not be preserved and serves as 
the watermark carrier. Previous researchers working in the 
area of medical imaging have not included tamper detection 
and recovery in their work.  
P. Wong describes a fragile marking technique in [6], which 
obtains a digest using a hash function. The image, image 
dimensions, and marking key are hashed during embedding 
and used to modify the least-significant bit plane of the 
original image. This is done in such a way that when the 
correct detection side information and unaltered marked 
image are provided to the detector, a bi-level image chosen by 
the owner (such as a company logo or insignia), is observed. 
This technique has localization properties and can identify 
regions of modified pixels within a marked image. However, 
Holliman and Memon [7] soon presented a vector 
quantization (VQ) counterfeiting attack that can construct a 
counterfeit image from a VQ codebook generated from a set 
of watermarked images. To solve the problem of VQ 
counterfeiting attack, several enhanced algorithms were 
proposed [8][9]. Nonetheless, they either fails to effectively 
address the problem or sacrifice tamper localization accuracy 
of the original methods [10]. Celik et al.[10] then presented 
an algorithm based on Wong’s scheme and demonstrated that 
their algorithm can thwart the VQ codebook attack while 
sustaining the localization property. 
In this paper, we propose a watermarking method for image 
tamper detection and recovery. We are interested in local 
manipulation such as additional or removal of part of an 
image. Our method is efficient as it only uses simple 
operations such as parity checks and comparison between 
average intensities as compared to method proposed by Celik 
et. al. [10]. 
 
Methodology 
    
We describe the watermarking embedding procedure in this 
section. Each image is of size M x N pixels where M and N 
are assumed to be a multiple of eight and the number of 
greylevels is 256. 
 
Preparation 
 
We need to prepare a one to one block (8x8 pixels) mapping 
sequence A → B→ C→ D → … → A for watermarking 
embedding, where each symbol denotes an individual block. 
The intensity feature of block A will be embedded in block B, 
and the intensity feature of block B will be embedded in 
block C, etc. Voyatzis and Pitas [11] presented a two 
dimensional, discrete Torus automorphism for creating a 
unique and random mapping of the pixels within an image. 
We use a 1D transformation based on [11] to get a one-to-one 
mapping: 
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where ],1[,, bNkBB ∈
v
 , k is a secret key ( prime number), and 
Nb is the total number of blocks in the image. 
The generation algorithm of the block-mapping sequence is 
as follows: 
• Divide the image into non-overlapping blocks of 8x8 
pixels. 
• Assign a unique integer },...,3,2,1{ bNB ∈ to each block 
from left to right and top to bottom, where Nb= (M/8) 
x (N/8). 
• Randomly pick a prime number ],1[ bNk ∈ . 
• For each block number B, apply equation (1) to 
obtain B
r
, the number of its mapping block. 
• Record all pairs of B and B
r
 to form the block 
mapping sequence. 
 
Table 1 - Mapping Of Blocks With K=23,26 And Nb=40 
 
k B 1 2 3 4 5 6 21 22 23 24 
23 B
r
 
24 7 30 13 36 19 4 27 10 33 
26 B
r
 
27 13 39 25 11 37 27 13 39 25 
 
Note that the secret key, k, must be a prime in order to obtain 
a one to one mapping; otherwise, the period is less than Nb 
and a one to many mapping may occur. Table 1 lists some 
parts of the mapping sequence generated with Nb=40, k=23 
(prime) and 26 (not prime) respectively. In this table, Br starts 
to repeat at B=21 when k=26, which is not a prime. 
 
Embedding 
 
For each block B of 8x8 pixels, we further divide it into four 
sub-blocks of 4x4 pixels. The watermark in each sub-block is 
a 3-tuple (v, p, r), where both v and p are 1-bit authentication 
watermark, and r is a 7-bit recovery watermark for the 
corresponding sub-block within block A mapped to B. The 
following algorithm describes how the 3-tuple watermark of 
each sub-block is generated and embedded: 
• Set the LSB of each pixel within the block to zero and 
compute the average intensity of the block and each of 
its four sub-blocks, denoted by avg_B and avg_Bs, 
respectively. 
• Generate the authentication watermark, v, of each sub-
block as: 
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• Generate the parity check bit, p, of each sub-block as: 
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where num is the total number of 1s in the seven MSBs of 
avg_Bs. 
• From the mapping sequence generated in the 
preparation step, obtain block A whose recovery 
information will be stored in block B. 
• Compute the average intensity of each corresponding 
sub-block As within A, and denote it avg_As. 
• Obtain the recovery intensity, r, of As by taking 7 
MSB in avg_As. Seven bits is used as we are using 
one bit for watermarking. 
• Embed the 3-tuple watermark (v, p, r), 9 bits in all, 
onto the LSB of of each pixel in a 3x3 block within Bs 
as shown in fig. 1, where r1 is the MSB, e.g. if the 
intensity of As is 155, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6 and r7 is 1, 
0, 0, 1, 1, 0 and 1 respectively. 
 
v p r1 
r2 r2 r4 
r5 r6 r7 
Figure 1- Watermark positioned in the LSB of 3x3 blocks 
 
 
Tamper Detection 
 
The test image is first divided into non-overlapping blocks of 
8x8 pixels, as in watermarking embedding process. For each 
block denoted as B
r
, we first set the LSBs of each pixel in B
r
 
to zero and compute its average intensity, denoted as avg_ B
r
. 
We then perform 2-level detection. In level-1 detection, we 
examine each 4x4 sub-block within one block. In level-2 
detection, we treat an 8x8 block as one unit. Level-3 detection 
is for VQ attack resilience only. The procedure of our 
hierarchical tamper detection scheme is described in the 
following: 
Level-1 detection 
• For each sub-block  B
r
s of 4x4 pixels within the block 
B
r
, perform the following steps: 
• Extract v and p from B
r
s. 
• Set the LSBs of each pixel within each B
r
s to zero and 
compute the average intensity for each sub-block B
r
s, 
denoted as avg_ B
r
s. 
• Count the total number of 1s in avg_ B
r
s and denote it 
as Ps. 
• Set the parity check bit p’ of B
r
s to 1 if Ps is odd, 
otherwise, set it to 0. 
• Compare p’ with p. If they are not equal, mark B
r
s as 
tampered and complete the detection for B
r
s. 
• Set the algebraic relation v’=1 if avg_ B
r
s>=avg_ B
r
, 
otherwise, set it to 0. 
• Compare v’ with v. If they are not equal, mark B
r
s as 
tampered and complete the detection for B
r
s; 
otherwise mark it valid. 
Level-2 detection 
For each block of size 8x8 pixels, mark this block tampered if 
any of its sub-block is marked tampered; otherwise mark it 
valid. 
Level-3 detection 
For each valid block B
r
 of size 8x8 pixels, perform the 
following steps: 
• Find the block number of block C, where block C is 
the one in which the intensity feature of block B
r
is 
embedded. 
• Locate block C. 
• If block C is marked tampered, assume block B
r
 is 
valid and complete the test. 
• If block C is valid, perform the following steps: 
• Obtain the 7-bit should-be intensity of each B
r
s by 
extracting the LSBs from each pixels in the 
corresponding block within block C, padding one zero 
to the end to make an 8-bit value. 
• Compare with avg_ B
r
s and mark B
r
 tampered if they 
are different. 
 
Image Recovery 
 
After the detection stage, all the blocks are marked either 
valid or tampered. We only need to recover the tampered 
blocks and leave those valid blocks as they are. For 
convenient, we call the tampered block, block B and the 
block embedded with its intensity, block C. The restoration 
procedure for each tampered block is described as follows: 
• Calculate the block number for block C. 
• Locate block C 
• Obtain the 7-bit intensity of each sub-block within 
block B, padding one zero to the end to make an 8-bit 
value. 
• Replace the new intensity of each pixel within the sub-
block with this new 8-bit intensity. 
• Repeat step 3 and 4 for all sub-blocks within block B. 
• Replace the new intensity of each pixel within the sub-
block with this new 8-bit intensity. 
• Repeat step 3 and 4 for all sub-blocks within block B. 
 
Results 
We carried out two experiments to test our algorithms. We 
watermarked our test image with peak signal to noise ratio of 
54.8 dB. In the first experiment, we tamper a watermarked 
image by adding a clone of part of the original image as in 
Figure 2 (a). Level-1 detection left some  
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Figure 2. (a) Tampered image (b) level-1 detection with 
some areas undetected (c) level-2 with 100%detection 
 
areas undetected as seen in Figure 2(b). 100% tamper was 
detected using level-2.  
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Figure 3 - Unrecovered blocks for single tampered block 
 
We used spread tampering and single block tampering 
ranging from 10% to 50% as shown in fig. 3 with k=3739 as 
shown in Fig. 4 for our second experiment to determine 
recovery rate of our method. Our results showed that we 
could recover all tampered areas for spread-tampered blocks 
and the result for single tampered block is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the security of medical images and 
review some work done regarding medical images. We also 
proposed a watermarking scheme that can detect tamper and 
recover the image. The purpose is to verify the integrity and 
authenticity of images. The experimental results demonstrate 
that the precision of tamper detection and localization is close 
to 100% after level-2 detection. The tamper recovery rate is 
better than 86% for a less than half tampered image.   
In keeping distortion level low, we could make sure that the 
watermarked image can still be valuable for other purpose, 
such as case study in school, with the patient’s confidential 
information is not being disclosed. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Tampered Images 
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